

ARCHIVE COPY

ASE 97-9
C 1

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

CORE COURSE ESSAY

CHARLES A RAY/CLASS OF 1997
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS

SEMINAR L

FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER CAPT ROSEMARY MARINER

FACULTY ADVISOR DR TERRY DEIBEL

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 1997		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The United States and Africa in the Post-Cold War Era				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

“The American fashion in continents is a fluctuating one. Europe is always with us; Asia and South America swim in and out of the center of our consciousness as the prevailing tides of the time dictate. Africa, rising and falling in American awareness, has never rivaled the other continents in its ability to capture our interest, and it does not now.” (*The United States and Africa*, The American Assembly, 1958)

“...Most Americans, indeed all but a relatively few--are either ignorant of African realities or badly misinformed.” (*African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1985)

“In the absence of concrete interests, images become more important in the formulation of policy.” (*Free at Last? U.S. Policy toward Africa and the End of the Cold War*, 1992)

Introduction

The relationship between the United States and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa has long been characterized by ambivalence and uncertainty. As a direct and indirect result of the slave trade, over 10 percent of the American population has its origins in Africa. Though the United States had no colonies in Africa,¹ American delegates participated in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, during which the European colonial powers carved up the continent and laid down some of the ground rules for an active scramble for colonies.

Until the end of World War II, the American government paid little attention to events in Africa. The rise of nationalist, anti-colonial movements and the onset of the Cold War, however, caused the United States to ‘rediscover’ Africa.

“For nearly four decades, U.S. policy toward Africa was shackled by the Cold War. From the end of World War II until late 1984, Washington’s interest in the continent fluctuated with changing estimates of the threat posed by real or imagined Soviet gains. ...the result was a policy fundamentally at odds with the expressed commitment of the United States to democracy and development.”²

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is faced with the difficult challenge of having to (re)define its interests in areas like Africa in other than the familiar geostrategic terms associated with containment of the Soviet Union. Once an arena of conflict with the Soviet Union, Africa is again on the periphery -- the subject of episodic U S interest. There are those who argue that U S interests in Africa are minimal (or, in fact, nonexistent), that events on the African continent in the absence of a clear military threat have no impact on U S national security, and call for little or no involvement. Despite this, we continue to be involved, for example in the crisis in eastern Zaire and Rwanda in the fall of 1996. Characteristic of our involvement in African affairs in the post-Cold War era, this episode appeared to lack a clear basis for U S involvement -- yet another reaction to events which were ignored until a crisis erupted.³

In traditional national security terms it is true that the United States has no vital interests in Africa. The President’s national security strategy of 1996, however, states that “Africa poses one of our greatest challenges and opportunities to enlarge the community of market democracies.”⁴ If we are to live up to this rhetoric our policy must be less

crisis-driven. It must grow out of a realistic assessment of our interests and goals, with an allocation of resources sufficient to achieve those goals

Begin at the beginning -- defining U.S. interests

Development of U S strategy toward the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, as with any area of the world, must begin with a clear statement of our interests, an assessment of the means available (actual or potential), an understanding of the context in which the means will be applied, and establishment of priorities for achievement. The first question to be asked is: why should we care about Africa? Though the continent is rich in natural resources and has vast economic potential, few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently attractive economic partners, and with the end of the Cold War, no country is important to the United States in a strategic sense.⁵ Georgetown University professor Carol Lancaster, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in February 1993 said,

“...However, Africa is an area where the values underlying U.S. foreign policy are most clearly challenged”⁶

Lancaster outlined three major issues with which the United States government must cope over the next ten years. The most important is the problem of peace and security, followed by the challenge of extending and consolidating democracy and the need for economic development. Armed conflicts are major contributing causes to the lack of economic development in Africa. Given the fragility of most African governments, development of conflict resolution mechanisms, Lancaster said in her testimony, is a major challenge. The U S and the international community have approached most conflicts in

Africa in an ad hoc fashion⁷ What is needed is a systematic approach involving development of guidelines on outside intervention and mechanisms on how conflict resolution will take place The U S cannot do it alone, Lancaster stated, but can act as a prod to get the international community and African regional organizations (such as ECOWAS and OAU)⁸ to develop guidelines and mechanisms

The Clinton administration's goals in Africa were outlined in May 12, 1993, testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa by State's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose⁹ Those goals were

- Promotion of democracy
- Conflict resolution, with greater African involvement
- Economic growth through free market systems
- Strengthened environmental and population programs
- Humanitarian assistance where needed to alleviate suffering
- Increased private sector involvement
- Incorporating Africa into a globally interdependent world

The Defense Department's role in implementing the administration's Africa policy was outlined by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs James L Woods

"First I see an absolutely undeniable and very critical link between security, political stability, and development If there is no security, there can be no political stability and consequently no sustainable development Without development, conditions deteriorate and there is no security."¹⁰

Woods went on to tell the committee that there is a need to design comprehensive and integrated approaches to development in Africa that take into account the political, economic and security components of development. In addition, he said, there should be closer exchange and coordination in the Washington interagency process.

The Department of Defense's 1995 statement of U.S. security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa¹¹ sums up DOD's view of the President's policy goals as follows:

- Promoting peace by preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts
- Providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering and hunger
- Fostering democracy and respect for human rights
- Supporting economic growth and sustainable development

The different priorities between the State and Defense listings point to a lack of interagency consensus on what the President's national policy really is. This might not seem important on the surface, but in an environment where resources for foreign affairs is likely to continue to decline, differences in priority can have a serious impact on programs. If the U.S. is to have a coherent and effective policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, or any region of the world for that matter, interagency coordination and consensus is essential.

A further example of a lack of interagency coordination and consensus is reflected in how the different agencies in Washington view "Africa." For the State Department, Africa effectively stops at the southern end of the Sahara Desert (Map 1), with the northern tier of countries belonging to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. USAID deals with the continent as a whole. DOD, like State, has broken the country up, but in a different way. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has responsibility for all African

countries except Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya and Madagascar (Map 2), which are in the areas of responsibility of other Unified Commands

Despite public pronouncements of our policy, the lack of coordination and an unclear understanding of Africa policy is reflected at the working level where policy gets translated into instructions for implementation by field agencies

“I don’t see that we have a clearly articulated policy toward Africa “The lofty ideals expressed in public statements have some relevance to our day-to-day work, but in the final analysis, budget realities bring things to a halt We cannot carry out great ideas because we do not have resources USAID has lost resources even faster than State, and is looking at a policy of *no presence -- no funding*, which has negative impact on some State program priorities State appears to have little or no control over USAID decisions ”¹²

Working level officials at State believe that we are doing well in the area of democratization. but it is still relatively uncoordinated “The problem,” said one mid-level State Department official, “is that because elections don’t require substantial involvement, we support the program until votes are counted, and then step back ” Left unsolved is the problem of building sustainable democratic government Another U S initiative that gets mixed reviews from working level officials is the proposal for development of an Africa Crisis Response Force (ACRF).¹³ This initiative was pushed by the National Security Council staff The U S has committed unilaterally to establish the force, but to date there has been only lukewarm support from African governments (Mali has been the only country to promise forces), and no support from our European allies

Means -- Matching Resources, Rhetoric and Resolve

Despite complaints about lack of interagency coordination and high level interest (other than in crises), by working level personnel at State, they recognized the limitations imposed by resource constraints.¹⁴ None of the individuals interviewed suggested that there be a significant increase in the funds made available for Africa. Rather, they called for a senior level assessment of our interests in Africa and prioritization based on those interests to optimize distribution of our limited resources

“We need to do a continent-wide assessment of problems in Africa, country by country. Some problems can probably best handled bilaterally, others call for regional solutions. From this assessment, we need to develop priorities, and then sell them to Congress and the public. In order for this to work, there will have to be high level executive branch advocacy in Congress.”¹⁵

DOD is currently reviewing security policy toward Africa, but it is doubtful that this will yield any new initiatives

“Neither conditions in Africa nor as our interests have changed since 1993. We no longer apply Cold War criteria, so Africa is no longer a superpower playground. But there is less focus on the continent. The analysis will yield the same conclusions.”¹⁶

Working level DOD officials, like their counterparts at State, concur in the need to establish priorities of areas of interest, but state that this has thus far only been done by the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The EUCOM commander-in-chief has designated a

number of focus countries on the continent to which priority is given for resource allocation

Considering the level of our bilateral aid (Table 1), the United States has limited leverage in Sub-Saharan Africa in material terms. Despite our contributions to multilateral development institutions (i.e., UNDP, the World Bank, etc.), our ability to influence events is equally limited. Given domestic budget realities, it is unlikely that this situation will change in the future. If we are to achieve our goals, however, it is essential that our limited assistance be put to more effective use.

A start can be made by matching rhetoric with resources and resolve. Policymakers must be "wary of making rhetorical commitments or threats whose implementation neither U.S. public opinion nor the U.S. Congress can be counted on to support."¹⁷

While U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are not vital, if the United States is to live up to its role as the world's remaining superpower, we can ill afford to discount an area four times the size of the U.S. with a population of over 600 million, and the world's fastest rates of population increase. Events in Africa do not pose a threat to America's national interest in the short term, but they do matter. Problems on the continent, if left unsolved, could at some point in the future have an impact on the United States. Mass movements of people, environmental degradation, and disease are issues that have no respect for national boundaries. An area of potential impact that receives scant attention is economic. While, as has been previously stated, Africa as a continent is not a significant to the U.S. economy (Table 2), the gross figures fail to consider Africa as a source of

strategic minerals important to U S national defense and to the economy as a whole Of eight minerals considered strategic,¹⁸ seven come in large part from countries in Africa “Without manganese, chromium, platinum and cobalt, there can be no automobiles, no airplanes, no jet engines, no satellites, and no sophisticated weapons --not even home appliances.”¹⁹ Despite stockpiles to hedge against short-term disruption of the flow of these items in a national emergency, an extended disruption could have severe economic consequences and a negative impact on our standard of living There is no indication that either State or DOD takes this into consideration when crafting policy for the region.

Creating a New Africa Policy

As an initial step toward developing an effective, realistic and goal-oriented policy toward Africa in the post-Cold War environment, I would suggest a revision of the elements outlined by Assistant Secretary Moose in his 1993 congressional testimony The following is based upon an analysis of the proposals of academics and government personnel (in interviews, publications and public statements), taking into account the limited U S interests in Africa, the resources available with which to pursue those interests, the African context, and the possibility of gaining the support of the congress and the American public

- Conflict prevention and resolution, with increased African involvement
- Promotion of economic growth through free market systems and improved government management
- Encouragement of good governance and democratization
- Strengthening of environmental and population programs

- Delivery of humanitarian assistance where needed to alleviate suffering
- Incorporating the whole of Africa into a globally interdependent world
- Increasing U S private sector involvement

Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Wars in Africa since the 1960s have disrupted economies, displaced large segments of the population, and destroyed culture and wildlife habitats. In the absence of peace, economic development and political reform will be difficult. The United States should actively promote peace negotiations in ongoing conflicts and support a stronger role for the UN and other regional and international bodies to maintain peace. African governments should be actively encouraged and supported in their efforts to prevent conflicts, and to resolve those that take place.²⁰

“Despite Africa’s current poverty(see Table 3), many African countries, including South Africa, Sudan, Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, and Nigeria, can make a significant contribution to global prosperity -- but only if they are at peace.”²¹ Demobilization and downsizing of bloated militaries should be an essential component of our conflict resolution strategy. As Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary Woods told Congress in 1993, “We believe that downsizing and demobilization are absolutely essential in many countries to the success of the goals of democracy and conflict resolution.”²² The administration estimated that \$20 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) would be needed in FY94 to support conflict resolution/prevention activities in Africa (a proposal was made to increase it to \$25 million by the House Foreign Affairs Committee). The U S intervention in Somalia cost over \$1 billion in FY93. While it does not take a math genius to see that prevention is more economical than after-the-crisis cure, there is a sense

of pessimism about the efficacy of short term preventive programs, however, that severely constrains any effort to break out of this crisis response mode. What is needed is a more targeted application of resources coupled with a hardheaded assessment of the chances of success. At the same time, programs should be flexible enough to permit shuffling of resources as conditions for success change from country to country.

Promotion of Economic Growth. Economic growth is essential if many of Africa's poor countries are to break the cycle of poverty. In order for economic programs to work, conditions of security must be established, thus conflict prevention and resolution should occupy a higher priority in U.S. planning. In crafting economic assistance programs, we should take heed of Jeffrey Herbst's comments in his 1992 book on U.S. economic policy in Africa, "since geopolitical concerns, rather than African realities, were what interested top policy makers, actual aid programs were seldom the result of a coherent, long-term vision. Rather, American assistance policy often embraced the fad of the moment, only to slowly renounce the initiative in light of the accumulated evidence of failure. In addition to being distracted by the Cold War, part of the problem has simply a rather difficult learning process of what works and what does not in Africa."²³ Our aid policy must be rethought so that it is more in line with the level of resources we are willing to commit. Rather than diffusion of aid, as was common in pursuit of policy goals during the Cold War, aid must be targeted to areas where it will do the most good. In addition, we must demonstrate the resolve to back our rhetorical commitments. "If African countries are going to risk the difficult process of economic reform, however, they must understand that, while the United States will be tough in its demands, it will not change its priorities in

the future.”²⁴ While we can accept that Africa is currently not vitally important to the American economy, the potential exists and should be recognized. Some analysts estimate that as much as 80 percent of Africa’s petroleum reserves remain undiscovered, and that reserves on the continent and offshore could reach nearly 15 percent of worldwide discoveries (see table 4 for list of selected crude oil producers). American dependence on African oil is minimal (we purchase over \$5 billion annually of Nigerian oil and \$2 billion from Angola), but Japan and Western Europe are heavily dependent on Mideast and African oil supplies. Greater exploitation of oil reserves in Africa could lessen American dependence on supply from the volatile middle east. While economic growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa lag behind much of the rest of the world, World Bank forecasts for the period 1996-2005 put them even with the rates expected for Latin America and the Caribbean and slightly ahead of North Africa and the Middle East (see Table 5)

Good Governance and Democratization. The history of democratization in the western, industrialized world should warn us that many of the attempts at political liberalization in Africa will fail, or at best, take many years to show significant progress. In Europe, democracy took hundreds of years to take hold, and was often the result of political failures. The highly nuanced political systems in the western democracies developed in response to unique cultural and political conditions in the respective societies. If we are to avoid disappointment in our Africa democratization policy, we must keep this in mind.

For a start, we must put away the myth of African “unity.” Africa is a vast continent of over 11.7 million square miles with over 50 countries (Map 3). Furthermore,

it contains hundreds of languages and tribal groups and societies as diverse as those that exist in Europe. Our policy on governance, while it will contain certain universals (e.g., respect for human rights and the rule of law), must be adapted to specific countries. It is generally believed that of all the parts of the developing world, Africa offers the least fertile ground for the development of democracy, given the post-independence pattern of one-party or military rule. "The military coup is now the greatest threat to democracy in Africa."²⁵ At the same time, the military has also served as the route to democratization, breaking the hold of one-party states. The problem is often one of how the military is to hand over power to an elected government without increasing instability. Effective democratization and governance programs in Africa should meet the following criteria: a) they should be concentrated in those countries that have shown a demonstrated commitment to good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, b) they should be entered into with the realization that progress will be slow and incremental, c) they must respect the right of Africans to choose their own political system, provided that choice is free and fair, and d) programs must be flexible enough to allow implementers to reprogram funding as conditions change. Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1993, "to African democrats and despots alike we must signal our unqualified support for authentic democratic government, strict compliance with human rights standards, and honest economic management. Those countries struggling to democratize must get our help. All the rest must get our message."²⁶ We must put to rest the assumption that competitive democracy is not viable in Third World states. John Wiseman, in his book, *Democracy in Black*

Africa, said "It is generally believed that, of all the parts of the Third World, Africa offers the least fertile soil for democracy"²⁷ This attitude, Wiseman maintained, is patronizing and wrong

"Much western scholarship on Africa has been plagued by the fear of being labeled ethno-centric. Thus, many western observers have bent over backward to try to support the claims to democracy of ruling elites in Africa who were banning all opposition to themselves and denying their peoples the right to choose their representatives in freely competitive elections Although the same people would have been justifiable horrified if their own governments had decided to ban all opposition, they were quite willing to accept it in Africa Hiding behind the spurious specter of ethno-centrism is a very real racism, however unintentional it may be, based on the idea that different standards of behavior should be adopted in dealing with Africa and that what is unacceptable in Europe or America is quite acceptable for black people in Africa."²⁸

Environment and Population. At 3 percent per annum, the average population growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in the world (see Table 6) This causes extreme environmental degradation and generates an increasingly young population that often has little or no access to education, health care or jobs The populations are shifting from rural to urban environments where crime, disease, poverty and despair are endemic Both the environmental impact and the burgeoning population pose a problem for the rest of the world in the future On the one hand, deforestation and desertification impact on global weather and climate with potential economic consequences Large concentrations of

urban poor can pose a threat to the stability not only of their own countries, but to neighboring countries. In addition, air travel, has brought the urban poor of the Third World closer to our doorsteps than ever before. In 1995, for instance, over 40 Sierra Leoneans (some traveling on false passports), showed up in Copenhagen seeking asylum. During the same period, the number of Sierra Leoneans requesting asylum at London's Heathrow Airport was so high that the UK instituted a visa requirement for Sierra Leoneans despite that country's membership in the British Commonwealth.

Humanitarian Assistance. The United States subscribes to the principle that those with should help those without. From an idealistic point of view, we can hardly stand by and do nothing when to do so means that large numbers of people will die. Realistically, effectively targeted humanitarian assistance can create an enabling environment that might preclude more expensive intervention at a later date. Whether view from a practical or idealistic perspective, we must continue to be prepared, in coordination with the rest of the international community, for humanitarian relief operations to relieve suffering.

Incorporating Africa into the Global Community. Though not critical to U.S. national security, there are intangible benefits to increasing the number of stable, representative, market-oriented countries in the world. While in the short run, political liberalization can unleash forces that lead to instability and social unrest, the long-term global economic benefits make it a worthwhile pursuit.

Private Sector Involvement. Until a stable policy climate prevails in developing countries, it will be difficult to attract large scale commercial interest. The number of countries in Africa where this is currently possible is limited (South Africa, Namibia, etc.)

We must be more aggressive in identifying potential areas of private sector activity and working with U S organizations to facilitate their involvement. A fertile field for private sector involvement in Africa is in the area of building or enhancing civil society in connection with our democratization and governance programs. Involvement of private American organizations (such as women's groups) with their African counterparts can supplement official programs which are essential if elections in transition societies are to be more than "one-man, one-vote, one-time."

The Ethnic Factor

"More than 10 percent of all Americans trace their roots back to Africa, and that heritage could help fashion future policy as much as have the domestic links to Eastern Europe, Israel and Greece."²⁹ Kenneth Adelman then went on to say that Americans should shelve the notion that American blacks give us a foot in the door, providing a necessary link to close and cordial relations to Africa. A contradictory view that is echoed in a number of publications dating from the 50s. Some authors, like Michael Clough in his book on post-Cold War policy toward Africa, imply that the argument that African-Americans have a greater claim on Africa policy than other ethnic groups suggests a lesser claim on policy towards other parts of the world.

The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has always been in the vanguard driving U S policy toward Africa - particularly the anti-apartheid policy on pre-1994 South Africa. There is now a quiet resurgence of the call for African-Americans to take a more active role in determining U S policy on Africa. Melvin P. Foote, Executive Director of Constituency for Africa (CFA), maintains that "African-Americans should be

the lead constituency for Africa ”³⁰ Foote said that there is a growing interest in Africa on the part of African-Americans, particularly middle and low-income blacks. He disagrees that this identification with Africa will marginalize American blacks. “An interest in Africa does not preclude interest in the rest of the world. In fact, this can lead to more of a global orientation, and this can help focus attention on solving domestic problems ”³¹

CFA is currently working to “mobilize and foster increased cooperation and coordination among a broad based coalition of American, African, and international organizations, institutions, and individuals committed to the progress and empowerment of Africa and African peoples ”³² As the U S policy shifts from “aid to trade,” the cooperation of private sector organizations on the CFA model will be invaluable

Conclusion

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Moose, in a February 29, 1996 speech at Howard University on “Why Africa is important,”³³ highlighted the transnational and economic issues that make it imperative that Africa occupy a more important place in U S foreign policy formulation. “The products of Africa are the staples of our everyday lives. Africa’s mineral resources are rivaled only by those of our own continent. Zimbabwe and South Africa supply nearly half the chromium used in the U S. Zaire and Zambia supply almost half the cobalt used in the U S and have 59 percent of the world’s reserves. These metals are used in the automotive, electrical, and petroleum-refining industries. In addition, Africa accounts for nearly half of the world’s production of bauxite, diamonds and palladium ”³⁴ In his speech, Moose also pointed out that Africa produces more than half of the world’s cocoa and a significant proportion of other tropical

crops (e g , coffee) He also noted that Africa's rivers and rain forests (second in importance only to those of the Amazon) are critical to the future health of the global environment

"There is no way that we can convince the public that our interests in Africa are vital "³⁵ Nonetheless, as long as humanitarian crises exist, American attention will be diverted to Africa In addition, because of the increasing importance of transnational issues such as the environment, population issues and disease, it is critical that we take a new look at Africa U S policy must, first and foremost, be defined so that it is comprehensible to the American people and to the world It must also be crafted in terms of our interests and of realities on the ground We are no longer straitjacketed by the narrow requirements of the Cold War doctrine of containment Now is the time to take a fresh look at the world - and this time, consider Africa to be a part of that world

Notes

1 Though not a colony in the traditional sense, Liberia, which was colonized from 1822 chiefly by freed blacks from the United States and recognized as an independent country in 1847, has been considered by many as a 'colony' of the United States. Until its independence, Liberia was 'managed' by white Americans in collaboration with the freed blacks (who came to be known as Americo-Liberians), and even after independence, Liberia's economy continued to be tied to the U S. American acknowledgment of its special relationship to and responsibility for Liberia has led to an extended and expensive U S commitment in that war-torn country.

2 Michael Clough *Free at Last? U S Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), page 1.

3 The 1996 crisis grew out of the exodus of 1.1 million Hutus to eastern Zaire from Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1994 massacre of 500,000 Tutsis by Hutu extremists (*Washington Post*, October-December 1996). Tutsi rebels inside Zaire, with assistance from the Rwandan army, attacked towns in the east near refugee camps, causing hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees to flee.

4 *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, pp 43-44.

5 Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, August 1995, 3.

6 Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Future of U S Foreign Policy (Part I, Regional Issues)*, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 23 February 1993, 140.

7 *Ibid*, 141.

8 ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States. OAU is Organization of African Unity.

9 Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1994 (Part 7, Hearings and Recommendations before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs)*, 103d Cong., 1st sess., 29 April, 5, 12 & 19 May 1993, 192.

10 *Ibid*, 79.

11 DOD, *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, 4.

12 Department of State (DOS) official, interviewed by author on December 4, 1996.

13 The ACRF would be a 120,000-man force made up of designated African forces and supported initially by the U S for training, logistics and transportation

14 DOS officials, interviewed by author on December 3, 4, and 5, 1996

15. Ibid.

16 Department of Defense (DOD) official, interviewed by author on December 11, 1996
The criteria used by DOD to determine interests is two-tiered Overall interest is categorized as "vital", "major", or "minor" Sub-Saharan Africa is classed as "minor" Resource allocations within a region are categorized as tiers 1, 2, and 3, with 1 being the highest priority In Africa, only non-combatant evacuations and humanitarian crises rate tier 1 All other operations are tier 3

17 Helen Kitchen, *U S Interests in Africa* (Washington, DC Praeger, 1983), 98

18 Chromium, cobalt, columbium, manganese, nickel, platinum, tantalum, and titanium

19 D Hargreaves and S Fromson, *World Index of Strategic Minerals Production, Exploitation and Risk* (New York: Facts on File, Inc , 1983), 8

20 While intervention by international organizations will be needed to help end some of the conflicts in Africa, Africans themselves are taking an increasingly active role, as witness the cease-fire between mutinous soldiers and government troops in the Central African Republic mediated by the heads of state of four neighboring countries in December 1996 (*Washington Post*, December 9, 1996)

21 Raymond W Copson, *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace* (New York M E Sharpe, 1994), 182

22 Congress, House, *Hearings and Recommendations for U S Foreign Assistance to Africa*, 81

23 Jeffrey Herbst, *U S Economic Policy Toward Africa* (New York Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 2

24. Ibid, 23.

25. John A Wiseman, *Democracy in Black Africa Survival and Revival* (New York Paragon House Publishers, 1990), 24

26 Congress, House, *The Future of U S Foreign Policy (Part I) Regional Issues*, 145-146

27 Wiseman, *Democracy in Black Africa Survival and Revival*, 11

28 Ibid, 5-6

29 Kenneth L. Adelman, *African Realities*, (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Inc., 1980), 18

30. Melvin P. Foote, interviewed by author on December 18, 1996

31 Ibid.

32 Constituency for Africa, *About the Constituency for Africa* A fact sheet given to author on December 18, 1996

33 "Why Africa is Important," a speech by George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, given on February 29, 1996 at Howard University, Washington, DC

34 An example of how access to Africa's minerals can affect the world economy is the shutdown of the rutile (titanium dioxide) mines in Sierra Leone by guerrilla activity in 1994-1995. This small West African country accounted for 25 percent of the world's supply of rutile which is used in the manufacture of white paint. Closure of the mine drove world prices of the mineral up to the point that the US-Australian-owned company (Sierra Rutile) made plans to resume production despite the ongoing war.

35 DOS official, interviewed by author

Bibliography

- Adelman, Kenneth L., *African Realities* New York: Crane, Russak & Co , Inc , 1980
- The American Assembly, *The American Assembly The United States and Africa* New York The American Assembly, 1958
- Andereggen, Anton, *France's Relationship with Subsaharan Africa* Westport, CT Praeger, 1994
- Bender, Gerald J , James S Coleman and Richard L Sklar, *African Crisis Areas and U S Foreign Policy* Berkeley University of California Press, 1985
- Boahen, A Adu, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987
- Boyd, Andrew, *An Atlas of World Affairs*, 9th ed New York Routledge, 1991
- Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1996*, CPAS 96-10003 Washington, DC. CIA, 1996
- Clough, Michael, *Free at Last? U S Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* New York. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992
- Copson, Raymond W , *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace* New York M E Sharpe, 1994
- Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa* Washington, DC DOD, 1995
- Emerson, Rupert, *Africa and United States Policy* Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall, Inc , 1967
- Freund, Bill, *The Making of Contemporary Africa The Development of African Society Since 1800* Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1984
- Gailey, Harry A , *Africa Troubled Continent* Malabar, FL Robert E Krieger Publishing Co Inc , 1983
- Hargreaves, D and S Fromson, *World Index of Strategic Minerals Production, Exploitation and Risk*. New York Facts on File, Inc , 1983
- Herbst, Jeffrey, *U S Economic Policy Toward Africa* New York Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992

Hodd, Michael, *The Economies of Africa* Boston G K Hall and Co , 1991

Iliffe, John, *Africans The History of a Continent* Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press, 1995

Jacobs, Walter Darnell, *African Turmoil and American Interests* New York American-African Affairs Association, Inc., 1976

Kitchen, Helen, *U S Interests in Africa* Washington, DC Praeger, 1983

Kornegay, Francis A Jr , *Washington and Africa Reagan, Congress, and an African Affairs Constituency in Transition* Washington, DC The African Bibliographic Center, 1982

Lax, Marc D , *Selected Strategic Minerals The Impending Crisis* New York University Press of America, 1992

Roberts, Brad, ed , *U S Foreign Policy after the Cold War* Cambridge, MA MIT Press, 1992

Strategic Minerals A Resource Crisis Washington, DC Council on Economics and National Security, 1981

Tucker, Robert W and William Watts, *Beyond Containment U S Foreign Policy in Transition* Washington, DC Potomac Associates, 1973

U S Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs *The Future of U S Foreign Policy (Part I, Regional Issues Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs* 103d Cong . 1st sess , 2,3,27 and 24 February and 18 March 1993

_____ *Democracy and Development in Africa Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Relations* 103d Cong , 1st sess , 22 April 1993

_____ *Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY 1994(Part 7) Hearings and Recommendations for U S Foreign Assistance to Africa before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Relations* 103d Cong , 1st sess . 29 April and 5, 12 and 19 May 1993

White House. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* Washington, DC GPO, 1996

Wiseman, John A , *Democracy in Black Africa Survival and Revival* New York Paragon House Publishers, 1990

TABLE 1. AID TO AFRICA, 1989
DISTRIBUTION BY DONOR

Multilateral.....	32%
France.....	21%
Germany.....	7%
Japan.....	7%
Italy.....	7%
United States.....	5%
United Kingdom.....	4%
Others.....	17%


Source OECD Development Cooperation 1990 Report (Paris OECD December 1990), adapted from *U S Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* by Michael Clough (p. 65)

TABLE 2. U.S. TRADE WITH AFRICA
(Percent of U.S. Total)

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988
Imports	3	6	8	3	2
Exports	3	3	2	2	1

Source: International Monetary Fund *Direction of Trade* (Washington DC), taken from *Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* page 15

TABLE 3. PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY
In Millions - 1993




Source: World Bank

TABLE 4. SELECTED CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION
(Thousand barrels per day)

	1992	1993	1994	1995
United States	7,171	6,847	6,662	6,530
Canada	1,604	1,677	1,742	1,798
United Kingdom	1,864	1,922	2,469	2,515
Saudi Arabia	8,308	8,087	8,000	8,067
Nigeria	1,902	1,905	1,883	1,887


Source Extracted from Central Intelligence Agency publication CPAS 96-10003 *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1996*
page 97

**TABLE 5. AVERAGE ANNUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
1996-2005**



Source: World Bank


TABLE 6. POPULATION GROWTH, 1980-87
(% per annum)



Source Derived from World Bank Development Report 1989 in *Washington and Africa Reagan Congress and an African Constituency in Transition* page 8



Map 1. Africa as seen by the State Department



Map 2. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Area of Responsibility



Map 3. Africa as it is, a huge and diverse continent.

Charles A. Ray, Department of State

*Association of the United States Army
Award*

*“The United States and Africa in the Post-
Cold War Era”*